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T H E  C O N C E P T  OF E C O N O M I C  GROWTH 
The purpose of this paper is to clarify certain issues which are 
prominent in discussions of the concept of economic growth. The 
main thesis is that the common practice of basing the definition of 
growth on an omnibus and pseudo-quantitative concept of aggre- 
gate economic welfare is not only untenable but is also unnecessary. 
The first point is widely accepted, but its implications are repressed 
behind protestations of “expediency” and “best approximation”. 
Acceptance of the second point lacks a careful exposition of an alter- 
native, i. e., the formulation of an operational but more positive and 
less value-laden concept. An attempt in that direction is offered 
here. 
I 
Quantitative analysis is widely regarded as the sine qua non of scien- 
tific social studies. But attempts at the precise measurement of social 
phenomena are almost invariably frustrated, in part by limitations 
on the data available, in part by the very intangibility of most social 
phenomena. The latter introduces an element of arbitrariness into 
the identification of the phenomena analyzed, and an element of 
subjectivity into the observations made. 
Clear and unambiguous definitions are a necessary preliminary 
to any precise analysis. The literature of the social sciences is a test- 
imony to the errors, unnecessary confusions, and prolonged debates 
which can result from ambiguity on the level of basic conceptuali- 
zation. But even explicit and unambiguous definitions can give rise 
to methodological debates. Definitions in the social sciences are 
objected to on any number of grounds, ranging from the broader 
philosophical legitimacy of their implications to their relevance or 
operational meaning in some particular context. While often not 
pertinent such criticism cannot always be conclusively countered. 
Not unexpectedly, an agnostic attitude toward the merit of debates 
over definitions has come to prevail, culminating in the common 
assertion that any definition is acceptable providing only that it is 
“operational” and that it is employed consistently. This assumption 
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is rejected here. I t  is argued that the synthesis of the outstanding 
contributions to the theory of economic growth and hence the reso- 
lution of the interminable debate over the appropriate approach to 
the analysis of the growth phenomenon, is impeded by the lack of 
a careful and intelligible analysis of the relationships between human 
behavior in a social context and the process of growth. Such analy- 
sis in turn is impeded by the lack of a careful formulation of the 
concept of economic growth which makes i t  amenable to analysis 
from this point of view. I t  is hoped that the present discussion will 
help to bridge this gap by setting the concept in a context which 
does emphasize the connection between behavior and this “eco- 
nomic” phenomenon. 
This diagnosis of the ills of growth economics is somewhat difficult 
to defend. I t  is essentially an impression derived from considering 
the conflicting analyses of the problem of artificially stimulating 
economic growth in the so-called underdeveloped areas of the 
world. Various eminent authorities argue that for this purpose the 
analytical categories and the substantive propositions of “tra- 
ditional” economic theory provide uncertain guides to policy makers 
and hence make but a minimal (if positive) contribution to the for- 
mulation of development policies. Such a statement is subject to 
various interpretations. At issue is the adequacy of some not too 
clearly identified body of theory in the context of some not too clearly 
defined problem. However, there seems to be agreement that the 
source of the inadequacy of “traditional” economic theory is its fail- 
ure to give explicit consideration to the dynamics of human be- 
havior, particularly the significance of differences in traditions, per- 
sonalities, learning aptitudes, and motivations as these manifest 
themselves in observable differences in economic behavior and 
economic performance (even in the context of superficially similar 
“institutional arrangements”). Neglect of the motivational content 
of economic behavior is alleged to involve a systematic neglect (or 
grossly simplified analysis) of the processes by which motivations 
and behavior patterns change or are changed. Thus, it is argued, 
the fundamental problem of economic development is largely ig- 
nored. Existing economic processes in underdeveloped areas are, 
furthermore, allegedly misinterpreted. They are viewed as though 
they were either direct extensions or substantive counterparts of 
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“western” behavior patterns and “western” economic institutions. 
For this reason, such analysis as is carried out on the behavioral 
and motivational levels is said to suffer from a narrow cultural rela- 
tivity. 
I t  is not clear whether this general argument is to be interpreted 
as implying that economic development poses a new range of pro- 
blems, essentially “non-economic” in character, which economic 
analysis “properly defined” is inherently unsuited to deal with, or 
whether it is an  economic process, and hence proper subject matter 
for economic analysis, but that “traditional” economic theory must 
be much modified and generalized to take account of the different 
behavior patterns if is to be adapted for this purpose. The two inter- 
pretations reflect different degress of agnosticism toward received 
economic theory. While the differences between these two inter- 
pretations may be more apparent than real, contrasting them in this 
way makes it apparent that a number of different issues are actually 
involved. At a minimum, the complex argument raises questions 
concerning the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the nature 
of economic theory, and hence the adequacy of existing theoretical 
propositions in the context of the problem being studied. Current 
generalized discussions of economic development are marred by 
considerable ambiguity concerning each of these issues as well as 
confusions resulting from a failure to distinguish among them. 
The subject matter of the present paper is relevant to the first of 
these issues, the nature of the phenomenon being studied. Comments 
on the other issues are made incidentally and mainly by way of 
indicating the further implications of the conclusions of the paper. 
The concept of economic development is not considered explicitly. 
Rather, the discussion is confined to the concept of economic growth. 
I t  is frequently argued that these are one and the same concept. One 
conclusion of the present analysis is that they represent different 
Qpes of concepts. The one, economic growth, has essentially objec- 
tive content. I t  relates to phenomena which can be defined and 
identified in terms of potentially measurable criteria. The other, 
economic development, has essentially subjective content. It implies 
an appraisal of economic performance in terms of criteria which 
reflect personal and social values. While it is possible to define 
uniquely the concept of economic growth, there can coexist simul- 
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taneously many definitions of economic development, among which 
it is not possible to choose without prior selection of a system of 
values. However, the present discussion does have relevance to the 
so-called problem of economic development. I t  is apparent that at 
the core of all of the concrete proposals for the acceleration of eco- 
nomic development however that may be defined are measures de- 
signed to accelerate what we will define as economic growth. This 
emphasis on the growth phenomenon per se implies that at least in 
the first instance the economist approaches the problem of economic 
development within the context of a theory of economic growth. 
The assumption that there is a uniquely correct or at least a 
uniquely appropriate definition of economic growth, openly invites 
a very fundamental type of criticism. Economists and other social 
scientists jealously guard their right to define concepts as they see 
fit. Like lexicographers they argue that the meanings of words must 
be essentially flexible, changing and developing with usage and 
with the dictates of the problem being studied. While such an 
operationalist position is attractive because of the emphasis it places 
on flexibility in research, pushed to the extreme it invites intellectual 
anarchy. I t  provides no guide to the delimitation of the various 
phenomena to be studied in our attempts to develop an integrated 
body of explanatory theory, nor does it assist in solving the already 
imposing problem of interpersonal and inter-disciplinary communi- 
cation. The development of a general theory of economic growth 
presupposes the existence of some discernible “real” phenomenon 
or process which we can agree unambiguously to call economic 
growth. Thus, it presupposes agreement on a “uniquely correct” 
definition of economic growth. If several inconsistent or overlapping 
definitions are regarded as equally admissable this must signify the 
existence of several different (although perhaps related) phenomena, 
each deserving seperate (or joint) study, and each, perhaps, an 
appropriate subject for theory. In the interests of clarity, however, 
each should be distinguished by a different label. 
I1 
Many discussions of the concept of economic growth contain a latent 
or expressed feeling that in some pure sense the concept of growth 
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belongs to the vocabulary of the biological sciences1. If true, this 
would suggest that it is used in economics by analogy-a result of 
considering economic units conceptually as if they were growing 
vital organisms. Many examples of similar analogies are to be found 
in the literature of the social sciences. The importance of Social 
Darwinism in the general development of social theory, and, more 
directly, the impact of evolutionary concepts on the so-called whol- 
istic critics of traditional economic theory are well known2. That 
similar ideas had an influence on economists more clearly in the 
mainstream of the development of economic theory is also apparent. 
How else can one explain the organic overtones of certain passages 
in the classics of economic theory? For example, we have the explicit 
statement of ALFRED MARSHALL that : 
“Progress” or “evolution”, industrial or social, is not mere increase or decrease. 
It is organic growth chastened and confined and occasionally reversed by the 
decay of innumerable factors, each of which influences and is influenced by those 
around it; and every such mutual influence varies with the stages which the 
respective factors have already reached in their growths. 
Generalizations relating to organicism are hazardous in light of 
the variety of senses in which the term is employed. Uses of organic- 
type concepts range from very literal and rigid organic interpreta- 
tions of society to very superficial almost off-hand analogies with no 
real content or analytical purpose. I t  is perhaps the literal organic 
interpretation which is most at issue: that is, an interpretation which 
pictures society as a functionally integrated complex entity, in 
which the strict logic of the organism imposes a discipline on the 
individual component units (individual = cells) , subjecting them to 
I .  KUZNETS, for example, is on record as having said: “Growth is a concept 
whose proper domicile is the study of organic units, and the use of the concept 
in economics is an example of that prevalent employment of analogy.. .” “Mea- 
surement of Economic Growth”, Tasks of Economic History, Supplement to the 
Journal of Economic History, VII (1947), pp. 10-34. 
I. See, for example, R. HOFSTADER, Social Darwinism in American Thought 
(revised edition; Boston, The Beacon Press, 1955) ; D. HAMILTON, ewtonian 
Classicism and Darwinian Institutionalism (University of New Mexico Publications in 
Economics, No. I ; Albuquerque, The University of New Mexico Press, 1953). 
3. A. MARSHALL, “Mechanical and Biological Analogies in Economics”, 
Memorials of Aljred Marshall, A.C. Pigou, ed. (New York: Kelley and Millman, 
195% P. 317. 
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control by the whole but denying them any measure of control over 
the whole. Such an approach has commonly been associated with a 
philosophy of social determinism and an attitude of virtual fatalism 
in human affairs which is largely out of harmony with the melio- 
ristic ambitions of the majority of contemporary economists. For 
this reason, rigid organicism has became philosophically unaccepta- 
ble to most economists. More significantly, the observable variety 
and flexibility of economic and social structures, the capacity for 
disorganization and reorganization which appears to be latent in 
any social organization, and the many examples of at least partially 
successful attempts to consciously intervene in and mould the func- 
tioning of the economy, seem to provide an apriori basis for rejecting 
at least the most rigid organic interpretation. The usefulness of such 
an approach to economic and social analysis has been significantly 
questioned in terms of its broad methodological implications4 and 
its possible specific applications5. 
When the concept of growth is used in an organic context it has 
reference to physical changes in living organisms which exist as 
c c  natural units”, i.e., as “...fixed complexes which ordinary exper- 
ience shows us belong togetheP6. They can be recognized as physi- 
cal objects possessing mass and describable in terms of measurable 
dimensions. Organisms can ordinarily be classified into more or less 
homogeneous groups on the basis of clusters of characteristics. For 
the members of any group the pattern of physical change which 
accompanies the growth process, while different in detail as external 
and internal conditions provide a more or less favorable environment, 
will be essentially similar in broad contours. Thus, in a general 
sense, there is much repetitiveness in the pattern of change, making 
it possible to abstract out of the life histories of a group of related 
organisms a typical life cycle and growth pattern. Such repetitiv- 
eness makes growth, its pattern and pace, statistically predictable. 
I t  makes it possible to analyze the growth process into a sequence of 
4. Cf. F.A. HAYEK, “Scientism and the Study of Society”, Economica, New 
Series, Vol. IX (August 1g42), pp. 267-291; Vol. x (February 1g43), pp. 34-53; 
Vol. XI (February I ~ M ) ,  pp. 27-39. 
5. Cf. E.T. PENROSE, “Biological Analogies and the Theory of the Firm”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. XLII (December 1g52), pp. 804-819. 
6. HAYEK, op. cit., part 111, p. 28. 
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stages of development and maturity, each stage having certain 
rather well defined characteristics. Growth in an organism, then, is 
associated with development into some “mature” form. 
The much quoted authority, W. D’ARCY THOMPSON, observes 
that even in biology, “growth is a somewhat vague word for a very 
complex matter”’. I t  has been defined “in a strict sense” as “an 
increase in the amount of the organism’s living matter or proto- 
plasm”8. Physical expansion is common, but perhaps not essential. 
BOULDING’S example of the butterfly may be a case in point. He 
notes : 
... the growth of the butterfly out of the chrysalis involves an actual decline in 
overall dimensions such as weight or volume, but certainly seems to come under 
the general phenomenon of growth or developmentg. 
Where physical expansion occurs, however, it is invariably accompa- 
nied by structural changes: changes in the form of the organism as 
defined by its relative magnitude in various directions. According 
to D’ARCY THOMPSON, at any moment in time an organism, in its 
physical attributes, can be described by a diagram of forces. The 
balance of forces accounts for the observed structure. From a static 
point of view, the structure itself appears to be a mechanism, a 
device which “checks and controls, and guides into determinate 
paths the workings of energy (Newtonian forces) lo”. However, it is 
a mechanism which in itself is subject to systematic change as a 
result of the dynamics of the development and interaction of those 
7. W. D’ARCY THOMPSON, n Growth and Form (Second edition; Cambridge, 
Theuniversity Press, ~ g p ) ,  p. 15. 
8. “. . .but it is often associated, as in a cucumber, with great accumulation of 
water, or, as in the case of bone, with the formation of much in the way of non- 
living walls around the living cells.. .” J. ARTHUR THOMPSON and PATRICK GEDDES, 
Life: Outlines of Biology (New York, Harper Bros., 1931) as cited in Harlow 
Shapely, Samuel Rapport and Helen Wright, ed., A Tr.m.su,y of Science (fourth 
edition; New York; Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 285. 
9. K. E. BOULDING, “Toward a General Theory of Growth”, Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXXI (August 1g53), p. 326. In this context, 
however, a distinction might be made between growth, “an increase in the amount 
of the organism’s living matter”, and development, “the formation of new and 
complex structures out of the undifferentiated and apparently simple”. Cf. 
THOMPSON and GEDDES, OF. cit., pp. 285, 289. 
10. THOMPSON, OF. cit., p. 291. 
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forces. The resulting changes in structure are the physical mani- 
festations of the growth process. 
The nature of the growth generating forces is difficult to specify. 
They are clearly an aspect of the process of metabolism of proteins 
which is invariably associated with life. Thus, they involve the in- 
gestion of foodmaterial, salts and water, and a ‘‘process of diffusion 
and chemical activity within the cell” leading normally to a chemical 
transformation of the material into protoplasm. A situation in which 
there is an excess of “food-income” over the LLeveryday expenses of 
living” results in an accumulation of protoplasm and hence growth 
as defined. Organic growth, then, would seem to have a chemical 
aspect and physical manifestations. However, THOMPSON and GEDDES 
note that “the power of growth must be taken as a fundamental 
characteristic of organisms, for it cannot as yet be described in 
chemical and physical terms” ll. 
A literal organic growth analogy in economics presupposes the 
possibility of identifying economic units which correspond to the 
“natural units” of biological analysis-economic “organisms” or 
super-organisms” which possess distinct and observable dimen- 
sions statistically predictable lifecycles, and the “power to grow”. 
Clearly, social and economic units can at best only be ascribed as 
nominal existence. Patterns of organization, subunits, and “boun- 
daries” can be identified and described, but only on the basis of 
observed regularities in human behavior. Social units have no in- 
dependent existence. The nature of the “power to grow” in either 
case is not clear. However, it is difficult to argue, on the basis of 
available information, that social units (even if they are identifi- 
able) have determinate natural life-cycles which are essentially 
repetitive and hence predictable. Such an hypothesis requires a 
level of abstraction and an historical perspective which render 
empirical testing on the basis of documented history of mankind 
almost impossiblelz. For this reason, the organic growth analogy 
can be said to involve an interesting but incompletely formulated 
and probably unusable hypothesis. 
C 4  
I I .  THOMPSON and GEDDES, 04. cit., p. 284. 
I 2. Cf. J. J. SPENGLER, “Theories of Socio-Economic Growth”, Universities- 
National Bureau Committee, Problems in the Study of Economic Growth, S. Kuznets, 
ed. (New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1g5g), pp. 97-101. 
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Indeed to pursue an organic analogy as the basis for interpreting 
the processes by which economic and social units change over time, 
one would have to go beyond the conception of growth per se. I t  
would be necessary to develop analogues to the biological concepts 
of mutation and selective evolution, introducing the notions of suc- 
cessive generations, of reproduction and of the impact of environ- 
mental factors on the inheritance and modification of traits (in- 
cluding the possible influences of experimentation and controlled 
by hybridization). With this elaboration of concepts the organic 
analogy loses its simplicity and hence most of its attractiveness. If 
the assumption of a statistically predictable life-cycle could be 
defended then growth analysis could be reduced to an analysis of the 
timing and pattern of structural changes and physical expansion, 
with due consideration given to the influence of alternative environ- 
mental conditions. However, if the possibility of yet unforeseen 
changes in these patterns is admitted, and the possibility of experi- 
mentation to achieve desirable “mutations” and “hybridizations” 
is allowed for, such a simple reduction is not possible. The deeper 
roots of the processes of economic and social change must be probed 
independently of biological studies. A mystical “power to grow” 
cannot be assumed a priori: the processes of economic and social 
change must be decomposed into their elements. For this purpose, 
a literal organic analogy seems to serve no useful purpose. 
This interpretation of the organic growth analogy can perhaps 
be criticized as unrepresentative. A part of the apparent intracta- 
bility of organicism in methodological debates probably derives from 
its essentially chameleonic character. The meaning of the term con- 
tinually changes, often without warning. Thus, it might be argued 
that it is possible to have an “organic point of view” without sub- 
scribing to the organic growth analogy as outlined above. What this 
seems to imply is an  opinion that research should be organized 
around an image of the economic unit in question as an integrated 
entity composed in a more or less complex fashion of various func- 
tionally distinct sub-units. This leads to a definition of growth based 
on the physical expansion of the larger entity, and the analysis of 
the functional significance of the various sub-units, the structural 
relationships among these sub-units, and the structural changes 
associated with growth. However, there is no formal organicism: no 
506 R O N A L D  A. S H E A R E R  
resort to deterministic causal hypotheses. Any apparent organic 
analogy is completely superficial, a reflection of the emphasis on the 
analysis of the expansion of the whole and the internal structural 
and functional relationships in the expansion process. This is a pos- 
sibility worthy of further consideration. While not carefully articu- 
lated, it can be argued that such a view is implicit in many con- 
temporary analyses of economic growth. 
I11 
The term growth generally carries a connotation of quantitative 
increase. Perhaps the most explicit statements that this connotation 
should be critical in interpreting the concept of economic growth are 
to be found in the writings of Professor KUZNETS. He argues rather 
forcefully that “... economic growth is essentially a quantitative 
concept”13, and hence if we are to make substantial progress in the 
empirical and theoretical analysis of the growth phenomenon, 
... we must consider the quantitative aspect as basic”l*. This point 
is generally accepted. However, there remains widespread dis- 
agreement as to the magnitude which is in fact the relevant measure 
of growth. Indeed, about the only unifying element in the various 
quantitative” definitions of economic growth is agreement that 
what ideally should be measured is the contribution of economic 
activity to the achievement of higher states of human welfare. In  
defining economic growth in this sense, it is argued that economic 
activity is purposive activity-that economic activity can only be 
identified and its results measured if there is a prior identification of 
the underlying purpose of that activity. I t  is admitted that the con- 
cept of purpose is somewhat vague, that a single purpose cannot be 
objectively established but must be imputed, that empirical veri- 
fication of any imputed purpose is impossible, and that by conse- 
quence any of a variety of purposes might be imputed with equal 
C C  
(6 
I 3. S. KUZNETS, “Toward a Theory of Economic Growth”, National P o l i v  for 
Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad, R. Lekachman, ed. (Garden City, Doubleday 
and Co., 1955), p. 16. 
14. S. KUZNETS, “Suggestions for an Inquiry into the Economic Growth of 
Nations”, Problem in the Study of Economic Growth, p. 6.  
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scientific impunity. However, it is argued that the imputed purpose 
with the broadest applicability in terms of the long-run ambitions 
of most people, and the one most commonly assumed in economic 
analysis, is the satisfaction of the felt-wants of the individual mem- 
bers of society. While the link between output and want satisfaction 
may be tenuous : 
. . .many practical and important purposes are served by regarding.. . the 
flows of the satisfaction yielding commodities and services.. . (as) . . . the true 
objectives counterpart of the subjective state described as welfare. Indeed, the 
world proceeds very much on the assumption that the flow of goods is an accurate 
indicator of economic welfare’s. 
Given a broad aggregate welfare concept of economic growth, 
the measurement of growth and hence the operating definition of 
growth must involve the evaluation of economic activity in terms of 
its contributions to the flow of welfare generating want-satisfactions. 
However, the nature of the link between observable economic 
activity and economic welfare so defined has not been empirically 
demonstrated. Any imputed linkage must rest on assumption, and 
alternative assumptions give rise to alternative operating definitions 
of economic growth. It is interesting, in light of the firm rooting of 
modern growth economics in quantitative methodology, that all of 
the accepted operating definitions of economic growth rest on pro- 
position which cannot be (or at least have not been) subjected to the 
crucial and convincing quantitative test. The result is a variety of 
accepted measures. 
Among these measures the one most widely employed is per 
capita national income. I t  is argued that given inter-temporal con- 
stancy in the basic wants of human beings, an increase in per capita 
income provides a relatively unambiguous indicator of an improve- 
ment in economic welfare. In  general, changes in the inter-personal 
distribution of income are neglected. I n  part, this reflects a feeling 
that changes in income distribution cannot be relied upon to bring 
15. I.B. KRAVIS, “The Scope of Economic Activity in International In- 
come Comparisons”, Problems in the International Comparison of Economic Accounts, 
Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, Studies in Income and 
Wealth, Vol. xx (New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1g57), 
P. 350. 
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about major changes in aggregate welfare in the long-runla. In part 
it may also reflect the interpretation of increases in per capita 
national income as indicative of increases in potential as opposed to 
realized economic welfare1 ’, and hence an implicit modification of 
the basis concept of economic growth. 
Dissent from this criteron has taken various forms. In some cases 
its logical and ethical foundations have been questioned. Important 
debates have occurred over the welfare interpretations which can be 
placed on statistics of changes in aggregate income, computed from 
market data, using various systems of price weights. Even under 
ideal circumstance, doubt is cast on the possibility of unambiguous 
statements18. These issues aside, a problem arises in employing the 
per capita income criterion in a situation in which the size of the 
population is changing. Accepting the basic welfare orientation, and 
making the necessary assumption that all human beings are “basi- 
cally” alike19, one can still ask which situation represents a higher 
level of welfare: one in which a given population receives a larger 
per capita income or one in which a larger population receives a 
constant per capita income20. 
Allowing for opposite changes in per capita “satisfaction” and 
the number of persons to be satisfied, it may be necessary (following 
this approach) to define a broader social welfare function which 
includes both as variables. This poses a very knotty problem for 
empirical economics. No method of quantifying such a function has 
yet been demonstrated which is both feasible and defensible. 
I t  is perhaps in implicit recognition of this dilemma that Kuz- 
NETS, in one of his many contributions, has suggested a two-pronged 
definition of growth: 
16. In this connection HLA MYINT’S interpretation of the classical view of the 
welfare problem is interesting. Cf. HLA MYINT, Theories of Welfare Economics 
(Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1948). 
17. Cf. J.R. HICKS, “On the Valuation of Social Income”, Economica, vm 
(New Series), May 1940, pp. 105-124; P.A. SAMUELSON, “Evaluation of Real 
National Income”, Oxford EconomicPapers, 11 (New Series), January 1950, pp. 1-29. 
18. See below, pp. 69-74. 
rg. S. KUZNETS, “National Income and Economic Welfare“, Economic Change 
20. N.S. BUCHANAN and H. ELLIS, Approaches to Economic Development (New 
(New York, W. W. Norton, 1g53), p. 204. 
York, Twentieth Century Fund, ~ g y j ) ,  p. 22. 
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For purposes of measurement, economic growth of a nation may be defined as 
a sustained increase in its population and product per capita”. 
This is not simply an alternative to an increase in aggregate out- 
put as the criterion of growth. Total output might increase with no 
change in population. While the rationale for the two-pronged 
criterion is not made obvious, KUZNETS does argue that “ ... a defi- 
nition of economic growth must reflect common experience”, and 
common experience is that a sustained increase in per capita product 
combined with secular stagnation or decline in population “rarelyYY 
occurs22. If theory is to provide a basis for prediction and control, 
it is necessary to sharply distinguish what are effectively separate 
phenomena, in order to identify the nature of possible causal re- 
lationships among them. Many would argue that KUZNETS is effec- 
tively combining possible causes with possible effects. Further more, 
it is difficult to see how this definition facilitates measurement. Un- 
less it can be demonstrated that the two components bear a rigid 
relationship to one another, a weighting system has to be devised to 
combine the components into a single aggregate or else the concept 
of a rate of growth becomes meaningless. Thus, given the general 
welfare approach, this raises again the problem of defining a more 
comprehensive social welfare function. While there can be not doubt 
that KUZNETS interprets the increase in per capita product as indi- 
cative of an increase in economic welfare, it is not clear from his 
writings that he places the same interpretation on the increase in 
population. By abandonning the relatively simpler per capita in- 
come index, KUZNETS, in this instance, renders the growth concept 
more ambiguous. 
Other definitions have been advanced which appear to reject the 
welfare measure in favor of a “productivity” measure as the criterion 
of growth. For example, COLIN CLARK has suggested that “the 
primary measure of economic growth must be real income obtained 
per hour worked”2S. I t  can be argued that a productivity definition 
21 .  S. KUZNETS, “Toward a Theory of Economic Growth”, National P o l i y  for  
Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad, R. Lekachman, ed. (Garden City, Doubleday 
and Co., 1g55), p. 16 (Italics added). 
22 .  Ibid., p. g g .  
23. C. CLARK, “Theory of Economic Growth”, Proceedings of the International 
Statistical Conferences (Washington, D. c., Econometric Society, 1947)) Vol. v, 
p. 112. 
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in this sense is actually derived from a welfare definition inasmuch 
as some notion of welfare or purpose is necessary to the definition of‘ 
end product. I t  is clear from his other works that CLARK does not 
intend to deny such a welfare connectionz4. 
Still other important exceptions to the per capita income criterion 
can also be noted. Reference has been made to various special indi- 
cators of changes in welfarez5. Objection has also been raised to 
any general neglect of changes in income distribution, and parti- 
cularly failure to put explicit emphasis on the reduction of “crush- 
ing” mass poverty in the process of rising average levels of incomez6. 
These all involve the use of alternate or supplementary indicators of 
success in achieving broad welfare purposes. Thus, they represent 
no real exception to the general welfare orientation of the growth 
concept. I t  is this orientation which is of particular interest here. 
While occasional exceptions are to be noted, a welfare orientation is 
typical of the economists’ approach to the definition and measure- 
ment of growth. 
IV 
The particular welfare concept involved in defining the concept of 
economic growth reflects the impact of the utilitarian philosophical 
tradition on the development of economic theory. Absolute good is 
attributed to the individual, his freedom of choice and his wishes or 
desires. While this is the formula for classical political liberalism, 
by formalizing individual choices into a conceptual framework of 
maximizing utility, it also provides the formula for a variety of 
central planning. If utility can be conceptually identified and an 
index to its maximization defined, and if the maximization of utility 
is prescribed as the ultimate objective of economic policy, it would 
follow that normative judgments could be made on a level of pure 
objectivity. HICKS makes this explicit: 
24. See the introduction to Conditions of Economic Progress (Second edition; 
25. Cf. N.S. BUCHANAN and H.S. ELLIS, Approaches to Economic Development 
26. Cf. J. VINER, International Trade and Economic Development (Glencoe, Illinois, 
London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., I 95 I ) .  
(New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1g55), p. 7. 
The Free Press, 1952)) pp. 126-128. 
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If the general aim of the economic system is the satisfaction of consumers’ 
wants, and if the satisfaction of individual wants is to conceive of as a maximizing 
of Utility, cannot the aim of the system be itself conceived of as a maximizing of 
Utility, Universal Utility as EDCEWORTH called it? If this could be done, and some 
measure of universal utility could be found, the economists’ function could be 
widened out, from the understanding of cause and effect to the judgment of the 
effects-whether from the point of view of want satisfaction they are to be judged 
as successful or unsuccessful, good or badz7. 
The aggregate welfare definition of economic growth derives 
directly from something approximating this concept of “Universal 
Utility”. Aggregate welfare is defined as a quantitative concept; as 
a phenomenon which “...can be brought under the category of 
greater or less”2s. The quantity which changes in the process of 
growth is precisely this quantity of aggregate economic welfare. 
Therefore the measurement of economic growth involves the meas- 
urement of changes in aggregate economic welfare. This is taken to 
mean a quantification of the neo-classical concept of real income. 
The Aow of goods and services-the concrete results of economic 
activity-are significant only as the physical counterparts of psychic 
want-satisfactions. An assumption must be made concerning the 
relationship between the quantity of each good or service and the 
resulting flow of want satisfactions, and, for purposes of aggregation, 
the goods must be assigned relative weights on this basis. I n  national 
income accounting it is usually assumed that relative market prices 
provide a set of weights suitable for this purpose. 
Severe conceptual problems arise in attempting to justify this 
accounting procedure. If economic growth is to be defined as a 
realized increase in economic welfare, it is necessary to demonstrate 
that the resulting statistics are an un-ambiguous indicator of in- 
creases in economic welfare. Rejecting JEVONS’ hypothesis that it is 
possible to devise (intuitively or otherwise) an independent measure 
of the welfare content of a given set of goods, the problem resolves 
into demonstrating that the required inferences can be made from 
observed behavior, and particularly from recorded quantities pur- 
chased and prices paid at various points in time. 
27. J. R. HICKS, A Revision o j  Demand 77zeory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956), 
28. A. C. PIGOU, The Economics of Welfare (London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 
p. 6. 
1920), p. 10. 
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Much has been written on the welfare interpretation of price- 
quantity data2Q. In  the case of a single individual (if it is possible 
to assume that his preferences do not change and that they can be 
represented by a set of well-behaved indifference surfaces) , reason- 
ably unambiguous conclusions relating to levels of welfare can be 
made from observed price-quantity data, if actual choices have been 
made30. However, these conclusions are not very interesting. This 
case represents a special limiting case of the more general multi- 
individual case. In the general case, the inferior and superior situa- 
tions cannot be as unambiguously identified from price-quantity 
data, even assuming constant preference maps, well-behaved in- 
difference functions, equilibrium prices and quantities and perfect 
markets31. Unless every individual prefers a particular situation to 
an earlier one, the problem of inter-personal comparisons arises. 
The obvious solution-a more generalized social welfare function 
which permits the netting of gains vs. losses-is a victim of self- 
denial. The impossibility of quantifying such a function is at the 
root of the agnosticism which has forced these intellectual exer- 
cises with the objective price-quantity data. Nor does the intro- 
duction of the possibility of compensation solve the problem. This 
would define an increase in social income as occuring whenever 
there is some inter-personal distribution of the goods and services 
produced in a given year which would put every member of the 
group in a preferred position relative to his actual real income in the 
earlier period32. In other words, there has occured a potential but 
not necessarily realized increase in the welfare of every individual, 
29. Cf. J.R. HICKS, “On the Valuation of Social Income”, Economicu, VII 
(New Series), May 1940, pp. 105-124; S. KUZNETS, “On the Valuation of Social 
Income-Reflections on Professor Hicks’ Article”, Economicu, xv (New Series), 
February 1948, pp. 1-16, May 1948, pp. I 16-131 ; P.A. SAMUELSON, “Evaluation 
of Real National Income”, Oxford Economic Pupers, II (New Series), January I 950, 
pp. 1-29; T. SCITOVSKY, Welfare and Competition (Chicago, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
1951)’ pp. 70-82; M. ABRAMOVITZ, “The Welfare Interpretation of Secular 
Trends in National Income and Product”, The Allocation of Economic Resources, 
M. Abramovitz, ed. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, xg5g), pp. 1-22. 
Further references are to be found in these works. 
30. Cf. J.R. HICKS, op. cit., pp. 108-1 10. 
3 I .  Cf. P. A. SAMUELSON, loc. cit., 
32. Cf. J. R. HICKS, op. cit., p. I I I .  
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as measured from the actual size and distribution of income in the 
base period. I t  has been demonstrated that cases can be imagined in 
which actual price-quantity data would not permit an unambiguous 
statement on this definitionss. Furthermore, it has been demon- 
strated that the possibility of the existence of some distribution of 
income in the later period which is potentially superior to that distri- 
bution actually existing in the base period is not inconsistent with 
the existence of some distribution of the income of the base period 
which is superior to some distribution of income in the later periods4. 
In other words, it is possible that no unambiguous statement can be 
made regarding the relative superiority of potential welfare in the 
later period relative to the potential welfare of the base period, 
because in SAMUELSON’S terms, the “utility possibility functions” of 
one situation may not lie uniformly within that for the other situ- 
ation. And, what is more important at the moment, it is impossible 
to tell from market data relating ot the actual price and quantities 
produced if the utility function does behave as required for an un- 
ambiguous definition of increase in aggregate welfare. 
Theoretical models of the type involved in these discussions of 
the welfare interpretation of price-quantity data are best inter- 
preted as attempts to specify the conditions necessary for a parti- 
cular interpretation of the data to be valids6. For this reason they 
are fundamentally different from those involved in what has come 
to be called positive economics. Having determined what the neces- 
sary conditions are, it becomes pertinent to ask whether it can be 
reasonably assumed that they are or can be in fact realized. In this 
type of analysis a questioning of assumptions is not only legitimate 
but necessary. 
Various aspects of the assumptions necessary to establish the wel- 
fare interpretation are of significance. HICKS has noted that “... com- 
parisons of economic welfare must proceed under the hypothesis of 
constant wants. I t  is only under this hypothesis that quantitative 
comparisons are possible”36. Such an assumption has never been 
33. Cf. J. R. HICKS, loc. n’t.; S. KUZNETS, loc. n’t. 
34. Cf. P. A. SAMUELSON, loc. cit. 
35. Cf. N. KALDOR, “A Classificatory Note on the Determinateness of Equi- 
36. HICKS, op. n’t., p. 107. 
librium”, Review of Economic Studies, I (1933/34), pp. 116-119. 
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empirically demonstrated to be valid. Intuition, buttressed by 
casual observation, suggests that individuals wants do change over 
time, and in a dramatic fashion. I t  is difficult to defend the assump- 
tion that observed changes in consumption patterns simply reflect 
the reorganization of expenditures in the face of changed production 
possibilities given constant indifference maps. This is true even if we 
were willing to accept the dubious convention of assuming that 
new” products are not really new-that a preference order for 
them existed prior to their introduction into the market, but that the 
price at which they could have been produced was previously too 
high to permit them to be purchased. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
know what interpretation is to be placed on the concept of constant 
wants in the context of maturing individuals, growing and changing 
populations, and changing cultural patterns. 
KUZNETS has offered a somewhat weaker interpretation of the 
concept of constant wants than that provided by the usual indif- 
ference curve analysis. He argues that: 
. . .the wants of men are sufficiently identical over time and similar in space to 
assume that they all want food, shelter, clothing, transportation, amusement, 
intellectual fare, and the like; that the specific forms which these wants take differ 
from time to time and place to place with the technology and complexity of pro- 
duction and social organization, but nevertheless there is essential parallelism 
residing in the identity of man as a member of the species homo sapiens3’. 
The empirical basis for such an assertion is equally dubious. Further- 
more, even if it were acceptable as a weak generalization, this would 
not be sufficient for the definition of an explicit index of improve- 
ments in economic welfare. 
Other aspects of the assumptions are also open to criticism in 
terms of their realism. A necessary assumption for the use of price 
weights in aggregation is that the prices are determined on perfect 
markets in which the various commodities are effectively choice 
alternatives to a given body of consumers. If the prices are actually 
arrived at on different markets, it is difficult to attribute the same 
significance to them. This problem is alleged to have minor signi- 
37. S. KUZNETS, “National Income and Economic Welfare”, p. 204. KUZNETS 
also observes that “This assumption is basic to any concept of economic welfare 
or progress, or for that matter of any welfare or progress. Unless we are willing to 
grant this essential identity of man, no comparisons are possible, no results that 
would relate to comparable identities”. 
C C  
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ficance for non-market activities which surround a market economy : 
prices can be imputed from analogous market activities on the as- 
sumption that the market and non-market activities are effective 
alternatives. However, much output is not directly purchased by 
consumers, although it may be argued that it indirectly satisfies 
some consumer want. This is true of goods purchased by govern- 
mental bodies. We have no assurance that the prices paid by ad- 
ministrators or imputed by statisticians correspond even closely to 
those which would have resulted had the consumer the possibility 
of choise. The argument that these prices reflect rational social 
choices and in fact correspond rather closely to marginal social 
rates of substitution which may deviate from marginal private rates 
of substitution, is far from convincing. I t  has the appearances of a 
convenient rationalization. 
The problem of accounting for private investment is somewhat 
the same as the problem of accounting for government purchases of 
goods and services. However, there is an additional complication 
is that not only do consumers not make the effective choices that 
establish market valuations, but also the goods are not destined for 
the immediate satisfaction of consumer wants. This, of course, was 
precisely the point being made by IRVING FISHER in his discussion 
of the income concept38. FISHER’S solution was to limit the income 
concept (as a utilitarian welfare concept) to current consumption. 
KUZNET’S solution is to treat as income present contributions to the 
satisfaction of consumer wants in the future. However, this also 
involves an assumption of doubtful validity : that the current market 
price (cost) of investment goods represents an accurate discounting 
of future consumer satisfactions. Alternatively, it might be assumed 
that there is some form of want-satisfaction derived now from invest- 
ment, e. g. satisfaction concerning the provision of well-being for 
future generations (and perhaps ourselves in the future). However, 
the analysis still runs afoul of the lack of effective consumer choice 
with respect to investments. Given effective choice, a different com- 
bination of outputs would probably result, indicating that the 
existing prices do not accurately reflect the underlying preference 
rates of substitution for the quantities and items produced. 
38. I. FISHER, The Theory ofznterest (New York, Macmillan and Go., I930), 
pp. 3-35; The Nature of Capital and Income (New York, Macmillan and Go., 1930). 
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The welfare interpretation of the price-quantity data assumes that 
the observed prices are equilibrium prices. This assumption is also 
of dubious acceptability. The recorded prices are averages of chang- 
ing prices over a finite period of time. They reflect market situations 
in various stages of adjustment to competitive and non-competitive 
equilibria. I n  addition, of course, the statistics available are often 
estimates rather than measurements. The coverage is incomplete ; 
the data imperfect. This is one of the familiar facts of life with which 
the economist unfortunately has to live. These problems of statistical 
practicability aside, a theoretical problem of coverage still exists. 
A decision must be made as to what constitutes “product” for pur- 
poses of analysis. Aside from the (partial) neglect of services which 
are not customarily a matter of market exchange and price making, 
problems are posed by sources of satisfactions which are truly free 
goods in one or both of the periods, and by new goods which are 
introduced either in addition to or in place of goods existing in the 
first period. Free goods are typically excluded from the aggregates 
on the grounds that changes in the quantity purchased (given con- 
stant wants) will not occur at a zero price, hence changes in the 
quantity available to be consumed will not affect welfare (as long 
as the price remains zero). The limitations of this assumption when 
the free status of a good changes is obvious39. 
V 
The difficulties involved in defining an index of changes in aggregate 
economic welfare on the basis of an individualistic ethic are but 
symptomatic of the underlying problem. I n  identifying economic 
growth as a subject suitable for scientific analysis, we implicitly 
assume that economic growth is an empirically observable property 
of observable economic units. I n  further specifying that economic 
growth has primarily quantitative manifestations we assume that it 
is a phenomenon which can be measured. I n  this sense it is an objec- 
39. The appropriate treatment of leisure in an aggregate welfare analysis also 
poses interesting problems. Cf. S. KUZNETS, “Long-Term Changes in the National 
Income of the United States of America Since I 870”, Incorm and Wealth, Series II 
(London, Bowes and Bowes, 1952, for the International Association for Research 
in Income and Wealth), pp. 63-69. 
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tive process. However, it also has subjective dimensions. That is, 
inasmuch as growth involves changes in social relationships and in 
the complex situations of individuals in the society, it will be the 
object of affective evaluations-it will be judged as “good” or 
“bad”, as “desirable” or “undesirable”. 
Such judgments will normally vary widely from person to per- 
son. Each affected individual can be expected to evaluate the 
changes on the basis of how he is affected, how cognizent he is of the 
effects on him and of the broader ramifications of the process, how 
he interprets the significance of these broader ramifications, and 
hence the weight he gives to the opinions of others (including the 
economists) and the value system which he employs to evaluate the 
personal and social consequences which he observes or expects. I n  
addition, apparently disinterested (in the sense of immediately un- 
affected) persons may provide evaluations of the process based on 
various criteria which they feel reflect desirable and undesirable 
situations, i.e., notions as to what is “good for” the economy or the 
people. There is no reason to expect that the judgments of the dis- 
interested parties will be any more unanimous than those of the 
directly interested parties. They will reflect divergent concepts of 
what the objectives of economic activity ought to be. These may 
range from essentially spiritual notions such as the attainment of 
the “good life”, to quasi-quantitative criteria such as a given size 
or distribution of national income. 
Such judgments, whether made by interested or disinterested 
parties, involve a different order of analysis than the discovery, de- 
scription, and measurement of growth. If economic growth is a 
real property of real economic units, there would seem to exist a 
correct” or “objective” measurement of growth in any particular 
instance. The same cannot be said of the appraisal of the observed 
growth. I t  can be simultaneously characterized as “good” and ‘cbad”, 
depending on the evaluative criteria employed, and on the observer; 
and without prior reference to some complex, and equally subjec- 
tive ethical system, there is no priori reason for preferring one judg- 
ment over another. For this reason, we much consider observation 
and measurement as conceptually distinct from, and, if policy for- 
mation is to be “rational”, logically prior to appraisal. 
T o  imply any welfare criterion as the basis for the definition of 
c c  
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economic growth is to deny the significance of any such distinction. 
Welfare is an evaluative concept. I t  implies a judgment as to lo- 
cation along a better-worse continuum. I t  can be debated whether 
this continuum must be regarded as dependent on the observer and 
his values, and hence is relative to time and place, or whether there 
exists in some sense a universally applicable, timeless (i.e., “ob- 
jective”) scale. While contemporary welfare theory would seem to 
suggest the former, the writings of the aggregate welfare school of 
growth analysis imply the latter. Indeed, inasmuch as the former 
approach denies the possibility of unambiguous intertemporal and 
interspatial welfare comparisons, a contrary assumption is essential 
to the aggregate welfare approach to growth analysis. 
VI 
If we are to consider economic growth to be a real phenomenon in 
the sense of something which can be observed and measured; and 
if we are going to deny the possibility of constructing an unambigu- 
ous and universely applicable measure of the results of economic 
activity defined in terms of some imputed welfare purpose, then we 
must be able to define and identify some entity-an economy- 
which can be said to grow in the sense of experiencing expansion in 
its (potentially) measurable dimensions. This again introduces the 
issue of organism. Indeed, as noted above40, if the ubiquitous re- 
ferences to the organic analogy in discussions of the concept of 
economic growth have any relevance, it is as an oblique statement 
of this point. 
This proposition raises a question which has dominated discus- 
sions of the foundations of social science: is it legitimate to say that 
there “exist” social entities which “ ... though they are always com- 
posed of individuals, are not, strictly speaking, reducible or divid- 
able into  individual^^^. I t  has been eloquently argued that while 
“persistent structures of relationships” can be identified and studied, 
to attribute any independent existence to these is to accept certain 
40. Cf. Supra, p. 66. 
41. S.F. NADEL, The Theory of Social Structure (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957), 
p. 20. 
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dubious metaphysical assumptions and to commit the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. In  this view, the only “natural unit”, and 
hence the only unit admissable in scientific analysis, is the concrete 
C O N C E P T  O F  E C O N O M I C  GROWTH 
natural” person. Social science is properly only an attempt C <  
. . . to grasp how the independent action of many men can produce coherent 
wholes, persistent structures of relationships which serve important human pur- 
poses without having been designed for that end42. 
The basic issue is the meaning of the expression “independent 
existence” as applied to the concept of society. One might argue 
that in so far as sociologists have been concerned with the develop- 
ment of a systematic general theory of social action, their first pro- 
blem has been to develop a theoretical framework which makes it 
possible to attribute existence to social units without resort to 
anthropomorphic or organic formulations. Indeed, Professor TAL- 
COTT PARSONS has attempted to show that such a theoretical frame- 
work (what he calls the “voluntaristic theory of action”) emerged 
inexorably out of theoretical developments in all of the traditional 
branches of social science43. In  each area it has been necessary to 
reconcile HAYEK’S observation that only individuals can choose and 
act with the equally empirical observation that these choices are- 
indeed must be-constrained within certain limits in any continu- 
ous situation involving mutual interdependence. The usual solution 
is to treat society simply as a mechanism (in the broadest sense of 
that word) 4 4  for guiding and harmonizing individual choices and 
actions. I t  is, however, a mechanism with only “nominal” existence. 
In  this sense, the social mechanism is a set of implicit rules of 
behavior, rules which are mutually understood and mutually re- 
spected, and hence which render possible predictions of behavior in 
particular contexts. This is not to imply perfect predictability, and 
hence predetermination of every specific action. Rather, it implies a 
42. F. A. HAYEK, “Scientism and the Study of Society”, part III, p. 27. See also 
43. T. PARSONS, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949). 
44. This implies a generalization of T H ~ M P ~ ~ N ’ s  definition, “From a physical 
point of view, we understand by a ‘mechanism’ whatsoever check or controls, and 
guides into determinate paths, the workings of energy.. .” W. D’ARCY THOMPSON, 
o@. cit., p. 29 I. 
T. PARSONS, The Social System (Glencoe, The Free Press, I 95 I ) ,  p. 3 I. 
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“set of ground rules” 4 5  within which individual choice can be 
exercised. Thus the social “whole” is not an organism, nor is it a 
mere aggregation of human beings. Conceptually it stands between 
the two extremes. “All societies ... involve a certain level of asso- 
ciation, a level closer and more intricate than a mere aggregation 
but looser and more complex than an organism4E.” 
Various discussions of the nature of the economy are extant in the 
literature of economics. There is no need to review these here. Cer- 
tain points derived from this discussion should be noted, however. 
Viewed on a physical level, the economy is a “production unit”. I t  
involves a systematic interrelationship of what can be called in a 
narrow technical sense productive activities. I t  is this fact of physical 
interrelationship, frequently conceptualized as “flows” of goods and 
services, which makes meaningful techniques of macro-economic 
analysis of production which are based on the concept of system 
(e. g. input-output analysis). However, the existence of this physical 
level of activity presupposes a behavioral level of activity-human 
decision making and human action. Thus, it is possible to define the 
economic system in terms of an interconnected pattern of “roles” as 
well as in terms of an interconnected pattern of physical productive 
activities. The activities implied in these economic roles do not even 
potentially exhaust the activities of the occupants of the roles. These 
concrete individuals must be simultaneously involved in roles which 
are not directly related to the “economic system”. Thus, from a 
behavioral point of view, the economy cannot be regarded as an 
independent system, but rather must be regarded as a subsystem 
within some broader social system. I n  PARSON’S terms, it is but one 
of four functionally distinct (but not necessarily empirically distin- 
guishable) 4 7  and functionally imperative subsystems within the 
45. Cf. H. A. SIMON, “The Role of Expectations in an Adaptive or Behavioristic 
Model”, in M. J. Bowman, ed., Expectations, Uncertain9 and Business Behavior 
(New York, Social Science Research Council, 1958), pp. 53. 
46. KINGSLEY DAVIS, Human Society (New York, The Macmillan Company, 
47. In this regard, note should be made of the problems encountered in 
attempting to identify empirically what is economic and what is not economic 
activity. E. E. HAGEN has observed that “...human activity is not divided into 
such two classes (as economic and non-economic) . . . , the two classes are not 
mutually exclusive”. E. E. HAGEN, “Comment”, Problem in the International Com- 
1949) > P. 24. 
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broader system of social action48. The activities involved will be 
related to the provision of the material requisites of social existence. 
This suggests the nature of the problem involved in attempting to 
define and identify the entity which undergoes physical expansion 
in the process of economic growth. If it is a dependent part of a 
social system, identification of an economy presupposes the identifi- 
cation of the broader system. Empirically, however, virtually no 
social system is truly isolated and hence an obvious, self-contained 
unit. Invariably some interaction is involved between at least se- 
lected members of the different social systems, no matter how the 
social boundaries are drawn, unless they are inclusive of all human 
beings. I n  this instance the concept loses all analytical usefulness. 
This appears to make the specification of the boundaries of the social 
system somewhat arbitrary, dependent on an  assessment of the 
degree of interaction. PARSONS’ further complicates the problem by 
defining a “society” as a social system which meets the criterion of 
“potential i n d e p e n d e n ~ e ” ~ ~ .  Such a criterion does not, however, 
parison of Economic Accounts, Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, 
Vol. xx (New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1g57), pp. 387-388. 
Concrete examples are provided A. R. PREST and I. G. STEWART in connection 
with attempts to measure the national income of Nigeria, where, they observe, 
“. . .the distinction between production and living, the distinction between wor- 
king and not working, . . .is often nebulous”. A. R. PREST and I. G. STEWART, 17re 
National Income of Nigeria, Colonial Research Studies, No. I (London, Her Ma- 
jesty’s Stationary Office, 1g53), p. 4. 
48. Cf. T. PARSONS, and N. J. SMELSER, Economy and Society (Glencoe, The Free 
Press, I 956). 
49. PARSONS defines (“in the simplest possible terms”) the concept of a social 
system as implying ”. . . a  plurality of individual actors interacting with each 
other in a situation which has at least a physical, or environmental aspect, actors 
who are motivated in terms of tending to the ‘optimization of gratification’, and 
whose relations to their situations including each other, is defined and mediated 
in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared symbols”. T. PARSONS, 
The Social System (Glencoe, The Free Press, I 95 I ) ,  pp. 5/6. Thus there is implied a 
body of individuals, a physical environment, patterns of motivation and shared 
cultural norms and symbols. The latter gives coherence to the system by providing 
a basis for persistent interaction. 
He further notes that to be worthy of study the social system must have means 
of “. . .duration sufficiently long to transcend the life span of the normal human 
individual, recruitment by biological reproduction and socialization of the on- 
coming generation”. Any social system “. . . which meets all of the essential func- 
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permit the identification of a set of mutually exclusive social systems 
which are uniquely societies and hence in some sense the fundamen- 
tal units for our analysis. Furthermore, in PARSONS’ terminology, it is 
not necessary that a social system be uniquely a society for it to be 
analysed, even from the point of view of economic growth. Thus, 
the specification of the units for analysis depends simply on the 
purpose of the investigation. One might find it equally interesting 
to probe the growth of the economy of a city, a geographic region, 
a nation state, etc. I n  each case, however, what is to be analyzed is 
the expailsion of the system of economic activities which is an inte- 
gral part of the particular social system specified. 
Certain implications follow from this discussion. I t  should be 
apparent that given interaction with other social systems, the eco- 
nomy of a given system need not be the sole source of the material 
requisites of existence; indeed, the activities involved in the economy 
of a given social system (but presumably not a Parsonian society) 
need not provide directly any of the material items consumed. Pro- 
duction for external trade is common, as are unilateral transfers to 
and from the outside. Likewise, it follows that economic growth in 
the sense of an expansion of the economy is not the only source of 
possible increases in aggregate economic welfare, if we define eco- 
nomic welfare in the traditional sense in terms of some concept of 
per capita (or total) national income. Given the same physical 
production activities, income could rise or fall as a result of changes 
in terms of trade with the outside world. The more narrow the 
definition of the economy being studied, the more probable that 
this is going to be an important phenomenon. Indeed, it is possible 
(given the familiar elasticity conditions) that economic growth could 
be detrimental to welfare in this sense as a result of the terms of 
trade effect. This provides added reason for distinguishing between 
economic welfare and economic growth, even if our ultimate inter- 
est is in some variant of the concept of economic welfare. 
tional prerequisites of long-term persistence from within its awn resources, will be 
called a society”. “It is not essential to the concept of a society that it should not be 
in any way empirically interdependent with other societies, but only that it should 
contain all the structural and functional fundamentals of an independently 
subsisting system.” That is, it should be potentially independent. Op. cit., p. 19 
(italics added). 
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This also provides the justification for the observation made 
above50 that economic development and economic growth are dis- 
tinct phenomena, probably but not necessarily related. Economic 
development presumably implies a movement away from a state of 
underdevelopment. I n  almost every context in which this latter con- 
cept appears in the literature, it carries the connotation of poor 
economic performance. I n  this sense, it can often be interpreted as 
a term of opprobrium. The specification of poor performance neces- 
sarily implies some standard of adequate or good performance. But 
this implies an evaluation or appraisal. Hence, economic under- 
development is an appraisal concept, of the same order as the con- 
cept of economic welfare, and hence inherentIy subjective. By im- 
plication, the derivative concept, economic development-i.e., im- 
proving performance-is also an appraisal concept. Universal agree- 
ment on the criteria to be employed in evaluating degrees of eco- 
nomic development, therefore, cannot be expected a priori, unless 
there is some prior agreement on a specific social welfare function. 
The lack of such agreement is amply reflected in the literature. I t  
is eminently conceivable that economic growth will not be accom- 
panied by economic development according to some of the implicit 
social welfare functions in common use. For example, the simplest 
of functions, equating social welfare with some index of per capita 
income, would yield this result if population were growing fast 
enough. 
V I I  
Two aspects of the concept of economic growth remain to be dis- 
cussed : the methodological problems encountered in the measure- 
ment of growth, and the implications of the concept for the nature 
of growth theory. The first of these will be considered in this section. 
While not directly pertinent to the problem at  hand, some of the 
theoretical implications will be briefly noted in the concluding 
section. 
Our critical survey of current usage of the concept of economic 
growth resulted in one important conclusion. Given the theoretical 
impossibility of specifying an unambiguous and objective measure 
of the welfare results of economic activity, if economic growth is to 
50. Cf. Supra, pp. 61/62. 
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be considered a real, objective, and quantitative phenomenon sub- 
ject to scientific analysis, then it must be possible to define some 
entity which has potentially measurable dimensions and which can 
be said to grow in the sense of experiencing an expansion in these 
dimensions. This entity is what has commonly been called an eco- 
nomy or an economic system. I t  can be related to the concept of a 
social system employed in wider analyses of social phenomena in 
that any economy is the subsystem of some broader social system. 
Thus, identification of the scope of the economic system presup- 
poses the identification of the broader social system in which the 
analyst is interested. This leaves many of the problems of definition 
in the hands of sociologists, and hence involves a rather weak con- 
clusion in so far as economic analysis is concerned. I t  amounts to 
saying that there is no uniquely correct unit in growth analysis. I t  
can be applied to any social unit providing only that the unit meets 
the minimum requirements of a social system (i.e., it involves asso- 
ciation, not mere aggregation). 
Just as the identification of the roles which constitute the eco- 
nomic system must involve the abstraction out ofthe reality ofhuman 
interaction of certain continuous elements-certain reciprocal “du- 
ties” and “rights” or “rules” of the game-so the specification of 
the dimensions of the economic system in the sense pertinent for 
growth analysis must involve the abstraction of continuities out of 
the complex of reality. If we regard the economic system in a general 
way as a system of activities involving the taking of materials from 
outside the system (raw materials from the natural environment or 
semi-process goods from other economic systems) and the processing 
of them to provide useable goods either for use within the social 
system or for trade with other systems, then the pertinent abstraction 
would seem to be that of “normal” aggregate productive capacity. 
The economic system can be said to grow if its “normal” aggregate 
physical capacity to produce goods and services expands. 
This definition involves no additions to the concepts of traditional 
economic theory. I t  simply involves a change in emphasis in growth 
measurement, from the evaluation of the results of economic ac- 
tivity to the measurement of the limits on the physical manifesta- 
tions of such activity. Thus it really involves an application of the 
concept of the production frontier, “...the hypersurface which cor- 
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responds, in n dimensions, to the substitution curve between the 
two commodities in the two commodity world” 61. Economic growth 
involves an outward movement in the production frontier, such that 
it is possible to produce more of some items without reducing the 
output of others (or more of all items simultaneously), and without 
resorting to abnormal pressures on the productive facilities. 
While this definition ofeconomic growth eliminates the conceptual 
and empirical problems which derive from equivocal assumptions 
regarding the nature of economic welfare and the relationship be- 
tween production and welfare, it obviously presents similarly formi- 
dable conceptual and empirical problems which it would be unwise 
to minimize. Indeed, these problems may severely limit the nature 
of the statements which may be made about economic growth in 
many specific contexts. They derive from the characteristics of the 
concept of the production frontier considered in relation to the 
types of data which it is reasonable to expect to be derived from 
the real world. I n  particular two sources of conceptual difficulty 
should be noted: ( I )  while the frontier relates to hypothetical pro- 
duction possibilities, the available data relates to realized output ; 
and ( 2 )  since productive capacity is to a significant degree deter- 
mined by the behavior patterns of the active agents in the system 
(including the natural environment), the frontier is to a significant 
degree flexible, even under what we might want to call stationary 
conditions. Even with the elimination of the ambiguities surround- 
ing the welfare based concepts, the measurement of economic 
growth is neither simple nor free from possible contradictions. 
I n  what follows a few of these problems are discussed, but only in 
the sketchiest of terms. The arguments and the problems are familiar 
in other contexts. I n  general, while they limit the conclusions which 
can be drawn from empirical analysis, they do not impugn either 
the “reality” or the analytical usefulness of the concept of economic 
growth. 
At any given point in time, all points on the frontier except one, 
the existing combination of outputs, must be hypothetical in the 
sense that while ceterus paribus each is a possible combination of out- 
puts, only the existing combination of outputs, is an actuality which 
5 I .  J. R. HICKS, “On the Valuation of Social Income-A Comment on Pro- 
fessor Kuznets’ Reflections”, p. 166. 
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can be observed. Indeed, under certain circumstances, the common 
case of general underemployment of resources, all points on the 
frontier will be hypothetical. If the existing combination of out- 
puts can be located within the frontier, the output of many or all 
commodities could be expanded simultaneously without growth 
occurring. Thus, in employing available aggregate data on pro- 
duction in order to measure growth, it is necessary to distinguish 
such observed changes in output as involve an increase in the degree 
of utilization of existing capacity, changes in the composition of out- 
put which involve no change in capacity (i.e ., movements along the 
frontier) , and actual expansions in capacity. 
This suggests one type of problem which is encountered in em- 
ploying data relating to the realized output in the study of economic 
growth, the problem of adjusting the data to levels representing the 
full utilization of capacity. The production frontier is determined in 
part by the quantity of human and material resources available and 
by the engineering requirements for production in the various lines 
of output; but given such information the frontier could not be 
specified without also specifying the response patterns of the various 
active agents in the production process. This is the familiar problem 
of the difference between supply in a behavioral sense and the 
physical quantity of some good or service potentially available. 
Examples could be multiplied as applied to each of the pertinent 
resources, but the case of labor resources will suffice to confirm the 
point. O n  the one hand, one can cite the evidence of the behavior 
of the labor force and hence capacity output under the unusual 
strains and psychology of a wartime economy, and on the other 
hand the observed variability of labor force participation under less 
servere changes in market conditions as illustrating the flexibility of 
this partial limit to productive capacity62. The labor supply cannot 
be regarded as a physical constant even with a given population. 
Any concept which thus relies upon some notion of normal behavior 
poses these familiar problems for empirical investigators. 
52. On this latter point, see the testimony of EWAN CLAGUE before the Joint 
Economic Committee, Hearings on Employment, Growth and Price Levels, Part 111 
(April 25-28, 1959)~ pp. 468-493; C.D. LONG, The Labor Force Under Changing 
Income and Emjjloyment (Princeton, Princeton University Press for the National 
Bureau for Economic Research, I 958). 
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For most purposes a refined measure of economic growth is not 
required. If the problem is simply to identify the existence of eco- 
nomic growth over any period of time, it is sufficient to provide a 
positive answer to the following question: would it be possible, ad- 
mitting of some reorganization of productive activities but main- 
taining normal levels of employment of human and material re- 
sources, to produce in the terminal year goods and services in the 
same kinds and quantities as it was possible to produce in the previ- 
ous years and still have some productive capacity unused”. Gener- 
ally speaking, the usual aggregate output data54, aggregated on the 
basis of average market prices prevailing in one of the time periods, 
and adjusted to allow for identifiable underemployment, will pro- 
vide a useable index for this purpose. The rationale for using price 
weights in aggregation is the classical hypothesis that in highly com- 
petitive markets, price should “in the long run” tend to approximate 
marginal rates of technical transformation in p r o d ~ c t i o n ~ ~ .  This 
assumption is of limited validity in a world characterized by fre- 
quent and wide changes in the structure of output, variable degrees 
of monopoly power, fluctuating levels of employment of capacity, 
53. Phrasing the question so that we are looking backward in chronological 
time seems preferable to phrasing it from the opposite point of view. It probably 
makes no difference in terms of identifying the presence of growth, and it mini- 
mizes (but does not eliminate) the conceptual difficulties posed by the introduction 
of new products. 
54. In this context the appropriate statistical concept would be gross domestic 
product rather than gross national product. The difference, which in most cases 
may not be great, derives from the existence of incomes accruing to residents 
which result from productive activities performed outside the nation (“net factor 
incomes received from abroad”). This again suggests the nature of the difference 
between this approach and the welfare approach. For the welfare approach, the 
appropriate concept would be gross national product. On the distinction see 
United Nations, A System of National Accounts and Supporting Tables, Studies in 
Method, No. 2 (New York, United Nations, 1g53), pp. 7/8, 17. 
55. I t  should be noted that this rationale of price weights for aggregation is 
free of the basic criticism made above, i. e., it is ethically neutral. However, many 
of the subsidiary criticisms do apply, particularly with respect to the implications 
of new products and changing degrees of monopoly power. Cf. Supra, pp. 72-74. 
It should also be noted that the use of price weights involves a simple linear appro- 
ximation; they can only be assumed to reflect marginal transformation rates for 
small reorganizations of the composition of output, not for large reorganizations. 
They can at best provide a crude index. 
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apparent aberrations from maximizing behavior, etc. Furthermore, 
given different relative price structures in different years, the in- 
vestigator is forced to choose among these structures in order to 
derive a consistently weighted index of growth. Clearly, there are 
situations in which the index will be sensitive to the price weights 
chosen. This would be particularly true if the changes in capacity 
were not great relative to the changes in relative prices, i.e. if the 
observable changes in the structure of prices were not associated with 
strong economic growth. However, it is doubtful that the dis- 
crepancies resulting from the choise of alternative possible sets of 
price weights, or from the assumption that any selected set of price 
weights roughly reflect the real marginal rates of transformation, 
will even approximate the errors introduced by inconsistencies in 
coverage over time and from gaps and errors in the data. If the 
growth process was strong and broad based (in the sense of en- 
compassing many sectors of the economy) during the period, almost 
any set of price weights will disclose the trend56. 
These observations again lead to a relatively weak conclusion. 
The concept economic growth does not lend itself to precise un- 
ambiguous quantification in the context of drastic changes in the 
composition of economic activity. I n  this situation the investigator 
can only proceed on the basis of estimates of changes in output 
aggregated on the basis of various sets of price weights and crudely 
adjusted to full-capacity levels. 
VIII  
I n  this paper an attempt has been made to clarify and resolve 
certain contradictory themes which have run through discussions of 
the concept of economic growth. The conclusions are neither radical 
nor strong. Indeed, the outcome can be regarded simply as a 
56. I t  can be noted paranthetically that a physical production capacity 
concept of growth necessarily raises certain questions with respect to the meaning 
of the concept of the “rate of economic growth”. The concept of a rate of change 
implies a single dimension. The production frontier is a multi-dimensional con- 
cept, and hence economic growth implies multi-dimensional changes. Only if one 
is willing to make some assumption with respect to the possibility of specifying 
a set of constant marginal rates of transformation is it possible to give simple 
meaning to the concept of a rate of growth in aggregate productive capacity. 
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systematic statement of points which many economists have already 
accepted in various contexts. The main achievement is the demon- 
stration of the possibility of formulating a concept of economic growth 
which is free of methodological pitfalls involved in definitions based 
on either organic or utilitarian welfare propositions: a demonstra- 
tion of the possibility of divorcing the problems of observation and 
measurement of the growth process from the much more complex 
and essentially subjective problem of evaluating the results of the 
growth process. On the level of empirical application, many of the 
problems which plague analysis based on the aggregate welfare 
definitions will also arise because many of the same statistical indi- 
cators must be used. These difficulties arise not from conflicting 
value judgments, however, but from the problems of statistical 
representation of the growth phenomenon5‘. As a result of these 
statistical problems, no accurate measure of economic growth is 
feasible. This is not a new conclusion-the necessity of working 
with rough indexes is obvious to anyone who has engaged in 
research in this field. 
This discussion also provides support for a particular point of 
view on the appropriate framework for a theory of economic 
growth. A tendency has developed to distinguish between economic 
and non-economic forces in the growth process, and hence to cate- 
gorize theoretical formulations as either economic or non-economic 
depending on the forces which are primarily emphasized. The 
arguments developed here imply that such a dichotomy is not pos- 
sible. One aspect of the development of growth theory must be the 
specification of necessary changes in the physical environment of 
economic activity, i.e., in the industrial structure, in the size and 
composition of the stock of capital equipment and inventories, in 
the structure and allocation of the labor force, etc. I t  is these changes 
which are often identified by the term “economic” forces. How- 
ever, they are not in any sense active growth creating forces: they 
are necessary conditions and physical manifestations of the growth 
process. If we are interested in the dynamics of causation, the 
analysis must be on the level of human behavior. I t  is human 
behavior which is the active element in the process. This makes 
57. In this sense they correspond to the problems involved in the quantitative 
analysis of growth in the biological sciences, cf. W. D’ARCY THOMPSON, op. cit. 
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relevant to growth economics all the multiplicity of factors-person- 
ality, institutions, culture, etc.-which appear to affect human 
motivations and hence human behavior patterns. The very defi- 
nition of the concept of economic growth provides obvious justi- 
fication for the proposition that the analysis of the process of eco- 
nomic growth must draw on all of the traditional social sciences. 
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S U M M A R Y  
The purpose of this paper is to clarify and resolve certain contradictory themes 
which have been prominent in discussions of the concept of economic growth. 
Given this emphasis on clarification, the conclusions are neither strong nor radical. 
I t  is demonstrated that it is possible to formulate a concept of economic growth 
which is free from the methodological pitfalls of definitions based on organic or 
utilitarian welfare propositions. For this purpose, it is necessary to define and 
identify some entity-an economy-which can be said to grow in the sense of 
experiencing an expansion in its potentially measurable dimensions. Under these 
conditions, the observation and measurement of economic growth become ana- 
lytically quite distinct from the subjective evaluation of the results of the growth 
process. Resolution of the basic methodological dilemmas, however, does not solve 
the basic empirical problem. Given the multidimensional nature of the “bounda- 
ries” of an economy, economic growth does not lend itself to simple, unambiguous 
quantification. The difficulties arise not from conflicting value judgments, but 
from the statistical problems inherent in the representation of so complex a 
phenomenon. The necessity of relying on crude indicators is obvious to anyone 
who has engaged in research in this field. 
Z U S A M  M E N  FASS U N G 
Der Zweck dieses Aufsatzes liegt in der Abklarung und Richtigstellung einiger 
sich widersprechender Ansichten, wie sie sich bei Diskussionen iiber das Wirt- 
schaftswachstum eingestellt haben. Der Verfasser kommt weder zu dogmatischen 
noch radikalen Schlussfolgerungen. Es wird dargelegt, dass es moglich ist, den 
Begriff Wirtschaftswachstum frei von methodologisch verfanglichen Begriffen zu 
definieren, die auf organisch- oder niitzlichkeitsbestimmten Wohlfahrtstheorien 
beruhen. Zu diesem Zweck ist es notwendig, eine bestimmte Einheit anzunehmen 
- eine Wirtschaft, von der gesagt werden kann, dass sie wachst im Sinne einer 
Ausdehnung ihrer messbaren Dimensionen. Unter diesen Bedingungen werden 
C O N C E P T  O F  E C O N O M I C  GROWTH 531 
Beobachtung und Messung des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums analytisch klar und 
frei von subjektiven Bewertungen. Die Losungen des grundsatzlichen, begrifflichen 
Dilemmas bringt jedoch noch keine Klarung des empirischen Problems. Ange- 
sichts der Vielfalt der Grenzgebiete einer Wirtschaft kann das wirtschaftliche 
Wachstum nicht lediglich quantitativ gemessen werden. Die Schwierigkeiten ent- 
stehen nicht aus sich widersprechenden Werturteilen, sondern aus den statisti- 
schen Problemen, die mit einem so vielfaltigen Begriff verbunden sind. Jedermann, 
der sich mit dieser Materie befasst hat, ist sich daruber klar, dass er sich nur zu oft 
auf grobe Schatzungen verlassen muss. 
Der Verfasser neigt einer bestimmten Ansicht zu hinsichtlich der Grundlagen 
einer Theorie des Wirtschaftswachstums. Er deutet an, dass der bekannte Zwie- 
spalt zwischen wirtschaftlichen und nichtwirtschaftlichen Kraften im Wachs- 
tumsprozess unbedeutend sei. Ein Aspekt der Wachstumstheorie muss die Bestim- 
mung der notwendigen Veranderungen in der physischen Umgebung der Wirt- 
schaftstatigkeit sein - Veranderungen, die oft als wirtschaftliche Krafte bezeichnet 
werden. Doch wenn wir an Kausalzusammenhangen interessiert sind, muss sich 
die Analyse auf die Ebene des menschlichen Verhaltens verlagern. Durch die De- 
finition des Wirtschaftswachstums selbst, wie sie im Artikel vorgenommen wird, 
ergibt sich klar, dass sich eine derartige Analyse auf Ergebnisse samtlicher tradi- 
tionellen Sozialwissenschaften stiitzen muss. 
R I ~ S U M ~  
Cet article se propose d’tclaircir et d’expliquer certaines contradictions qui se sont 
manifesttes dans les discussions sur la croissance de l’kconomie. Les conclusions 
de l’auteur ne sont ni trop dogmatiques ni trop stvkres. L’article dtmontre qu’il est 
possible de dtfinir la croissance tconomique sans avoir recours B des termes mttho- 
dologiques plus ou moins risquts rappelant les thtories utilitaires ou organiques 
du bien-&tre kconomique. I1 est ntcessaire h cet effet de partir d’une unitt connue, 
d’une tconomie dont on peut dire qu’elle est en ttat de croissance, ce terme &ant 
pris dans le sens d’extension des dimensions mesurables. Dans ces conditions, on 
peut observer et mesurer la croissance tconomique sans que des tvaluations sub- 
jectives faussent les rtsultats de l’analyse. Si I’on peut rtsoudre ainsi le dilemme 
mkthodologique fondamental, on est cependant bien loin encore d’une solution du  
probltme empirique. Etant donnt la grande diversitt des domaines qui se ratta- 
chent B une kconomie et en forment le cadre, on ne saurait se borner B une analyse 
quantitative de la croissance tconomique. Les difficultts ne naissept pas des juge- 
ments contradictoires, mais des probltmes statistiques qui se rattachent A un pht- 
nomtne si complexe. Quiconque a ttudie cette matitre sait que l’on doit souvent 
se contenter de donnkes approximatives et d’tvaluations qui manquent d’exacti- 
tude. 
En ce qui concerne les bases d’une thtorie de la croissance de l’tconomie, 
l’auteur se rapproche d’un point de vue clairement dtfini. Les arguments qu’il 
prtsente impliquent que l’opposition bien connue des forces << tconomiques w et 
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<<non-tconomiquesn ne joue pas un grand r61e dans le processus de croissance. 
L’un des aspects de la thCorie de la croissance doit &tre la dttermination des modi- 
fications ntcessaires du voisinage physique d’une activitt tconomique - modifica- 
tions qui ont souvent t t t  identifites a w  forces Cconomiques. Si l’on s’inttresse 
cependant A l’interdtpendance des causes et des effets, on exigera que l’analyse 
se place sur la plan du comportement humain. I1 ressort clairement de la dtfinition 
de la croissance tconomique que nous donne le prtsent article qu’une telle ana- 
lyse doit se baser sur des donntes englobant toutes les sciences sociales tradition- 
nelles. 
